Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
When a machine that smokes a cigarette to measure its relative tar and nicotine content, the machine finds the cigarette has less tar and nicotine. Humans, however, smoke light cigarettes to suck as much nicotine and tar out of the cigarette as they would with a regular cigarette. It turns out that light cigarettes are actually worse than regular cigarettes.
It has two provisions that preempt state laws. One provision says that a state can not make the tobacco company say more about health than the warnings required by the labeling act. That's not the preemption statute that we are concerned with here.
The second provision prevents states from prohibiting statements on smoking and health: "no requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under state law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the package of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter."
So the question is: Is Ms. Goods allegations of fraud in the advertising of cigarettes, a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health under state law?
First, the Court evaluated the congressional intent by reading the statute and case law. As the statute explained its purpose, Congress intended that diverse, non-uniform, and confusing the cigarette labeling and advertising regulations not impose burdens on commerce. Or one might say, preemption prevents states from imposing additional restrictions on cigarette packaging so that the cigarette companies could keep track of what needed to be on the label. States can't enforce rules that are based on an assumption that the federal warnings are inadequate. On the other hand, tobacco companies are not protected for their inaccurate statements about the relationship between smoking and health.
From an intent perspective, the Court decided that the federal statute intended to prevent states from modifying or adding information to cigarette labeling.
Second, the Court compared this case to earlier cases that were similar. There were to earlier cases that interpreted this part of the statute. The first case, Cipollone held that the statute does not prohibit all common law claims that have some relationship smoking and health.
That case created a test: "whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health… with respect to… advertising or promotion giving and that clause affair but narrow reading."
Gosh, what were we talking about again? A shorter way to put it might be: "Is the lawsuit narrowly based on smoking and health advertizing?" If it is, then it's preempted. And as Cipollone said, if its based on something else, like concealing material facts, then the law is not preempted.
In the other case, Reilly, a state had regulated cigarette advertising directly. So that case has no application here.
The court also rejected the cigarettes companies call to reverse the prior precedent. The majority adopts Cipollone - as a "fair understanding" of the congressional purpose for this preemption statute.
Third, the court looked at other cases that had preempted state laws. Those statutes say different things. The Court interpreted those statutes differently, and those cases don't apply to this statute. So the court did not use them.
Finally, the Court rejected implied preemption. The cigarette companies argued that the FTC has promoted the development and consumption of low tar cigarettes. The FTC approved the use of the terms a "factual statement of the tar and nicotine content of the smoke" of light cigarettes. Thus, the state law would be preempted by the FTC's policies. The problem of course, is that the FTC didn't think it was preempting state law. In the government briefs, the FTC disagreed with the cigarette companies. It has not authorized the use of "light" and "low tar" on cigarette packages. The FTC has concluded that consumers will not necessarily get less tar from a "light" cigarette because of the way people actually smoke light cigarettes.
The problem is this: if we apply the test that the majority adopted, cigarette manufacturers have to change how they advertise the healthfulness of cigarettes. And isn't that what Congress intended to preempt?
In this instance, the plaintiffs are complaining that the cigarette companies misled them regarding the relative healthfulness of the cigarettes. By calling it a "light" a cigarette, the cigarette manufacturer induced purchases based on the healthfulness of the cigarettes. Consumers thought it was healthier to smoke light cigarettes. But the statute says, "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law . . .."
According to the dissent the lack of a clear test has caused confusion in lower courts, and the test is difficult to apply.
The dissent's also complains that the principles that apply to preemption cases have changed since Cipollone. The presumption against preemption, which was used in Cipollone, is no longer consistently applied.
The dissent would have reversed a lower court.